Epistemic Decision Theory as Decision Theory

Patricia Rich 研究员(University of Hamburg)
星期三, 十一月 15, 2017 - 15:00 to 17:00

The premise of Epistemic Decision Theory is that ordinary Decision Theory provides content-blind assessments of when one state is better than another, so it should apply to epistemic states just as it applies to pragmatic choices. Practitioners of Epistemic Decision Theory have translated decision-theoretic principles into epistemology and used them to justify principles of rational belief such as Probabilism, the Principal Principle, the Principle of Indifference, and update by conditionalization. I argue that Epistemic Decision Theory still has much to learn from ordinary Decision Theory, and in particular that many long-standing debates and foundational questions in Decision Theory have important consequences for Epistemic Decision Theory. Examples include the role of representation theorems, the ontological status of credences and utilities, the nature of mixed strategies, and the purpose of normative judgments. I show that on an orthodox interpretation of Decision Theory, Epistemic Decision Theory looks quite different from its present incarnation.\r\n