2018年6月14日，由中山大学逻辑与认知研究所主办的“中山大学2018分析哲学工作坊”在锡昌堂515室顺利举办。本次工作坊由我所任远副教授主持，主讲人及题目包括：1.黄敏（中山大学）“Rule-following and truth”；2.任会明（山东大学）“True belief does not come cheap”；3.钟磊（香港中文大学）“Physicalism without Supervenience”；4.汤志恒（华中科技大学）“Timeless causation”；5.刘畅（中国人民大学）“Accordion Effect and Responsibility”。
主要内容：This talk demonstrates the structure and purpose of Wittgenstein’s rule-following argument through a close examination of the text of Philosophical Investigations. I argue that the rule-following argument has a deep connection with one of Frege’s ideas about truth, which I term ‘the inertness thesis about truth’. Having established this connection, we see how Wittgenstein contrives to induce the reader to notice the attitude towards rules, namely the contrast between practical and theoretical attitudes. His argument is that practical attitudes, rather than theoretical attitudes, are effective. I offer a reason in support of Wittgenstein’s claim that there cannot be any metaphysics for rules or meanings.